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Wage Analysis for Nurses Using Job and Worker Attributes
*
 
The nursing labor market presents an apparent puzzle. Hospitals report chronic shortages, 
yet standard wage analysis shows that nursing wages have increased over time and greatly 
exceed those received by other college-educated women. This paper addresses this puzzle. 
Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) are matched with detailed job content 
descriptors from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Nursing jobs require higher 
levels of skills and more difficult working conditions than do jobs for other college educated 
workers. A standard CPS-only wage regression shows a registered nurse (RN) wage 
advantage of .22 log points compared to a pooled male/female group of college-educated 
workers. Control for O*NET job attributes reduces the RN gap to .08, while an arguably 
preferable nonparametric estimator produces a wage gap estimate close to zero. We 
conclude that nurses receive compensation close to long-run opportunity costs, narrowing if 
not resolving the RN wage-shortage puzzle. 
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1. Introduction   
The labor market for registered nurses (RNs) presents an apparent puzzle.  Nurses are widely 
believed to be in short supply, with hospitals reporting unfilled vacancies over sustained periods and 
shortfalls in future supplies of nurses widely predicted.
1  Sustained shortages of RNs are seemingly 
inconsistent with a theory of competitive markets wherein wages tend toward levels equating labor 
demand and supply.
2  Sustained shortages can exist in monopsonistic labor markets, yet evidence 
supporting nursing monopsony is neither abundant nor compelling (e.g., Hirsch and Schumacher 2005; 
Matsudaira 2008).  Moreover, wage analyses indicate that RN relative wages have increased markedly 
over time and are well in excess of wages received by other college-educated women.  In short, an 
argument can be made that RNs are on average “underpaid” based on evidence of shortages.  And an 
argument can be made that RNs are “overpaid” based on wage analyses.  It is unlikely that both views are 
correct.  
In this study we address the nursing wage-employment puzzle and attempt to answer the question 
in the title: Are registered nurses paid wages well below, well above, or close to long-run opportunity 
costs?  We examine a large dataset containing information on individual RN and non-RN wages and 
attributes.  These data are supplemented by a newly developed database providing a rich set of job content 
descriptors measuring occupational skills and working conditions.  Standard wage equation analysis from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) suggests a substantial wage premium for RNs relative to other 
college-educated women, following controls for worker and location characteristics.  Detailed job content 
descriptors from the Occupation Information Network (O*NET) provide evidence that nursing jobs 
involve relatively high levels of skill and demanding working conditions.  Incorporating the O*NET 
measures of job content into the CPS analysis, coupled with an expansion of the comparison group to 
include male as well as female workers, sharply reduces estimates of relative RN wages.  Use of a non-
parametric rather than standard Mincerian semilog regression approach reduces estimates of the RN 
differential further, suggesting that RNs are paid wages close to long-run opportunity costs.  We find little 
evidence that nursing wages fall below opportunity costs, at least not to any substantial degree. 
Our analysis does not fully “solve” the RN shortage puzzle stated at the outset, but does sharply 
reduce its dimensions.  We conclude that nurses receive wages close to opportunity costs.  We suggest 
(but do not provide direct evidence) that increasing demand for RNs combined with barriers and sluggish 
 
1 See National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2002); Spetz and Given (2003), and Aiken (2008). 
2 Our focus is on “economic” shortages, which exist when there is excess demand at the current wage level or, in a 
dynamic setting, labor demand is increasing faster than supply and wages are slow to adjust.  The nursing human 
resource literature often focuses on “need-based” shortages, which can be defined to exist when the available 
number of workers is less than the number analysts regard as necessary to serve a given market.  See Folland, 
Goodman, and Stano (2007, pp 338-344).  
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growth in RN training can produce both periodic nursing shortages and wages moderately higher than 
long-run opportunity costs. 
Apart from addressing the wage-employment puzzle among registered nurses, an implication of the 
paper is that wage and job analyses in health (and non-health) labor markets are enriched through the 
consideration of job content measures of skill and working conditions.  In what follows we first review 
theory and evidence on nursing wages and employment.  We then discuss construction of the matched 
CPS/O*NET database and provide evidence on how RNs compare to other college-educated workers in 
wages, required job skills, and working conditions.   
2.  Theory and evidence on nursing labor markets  
Competitive labor markets have multiple employers, minimal entry barriers among workers and 
firms, worker mobility across employers, and good information among workers and employers regarding 
employment and wage opportunities.  Such markets should produce wages roughly the same among 
similarly skilled workers with similar preferences who perform similar levels of work (i.e., skills and 
working conditions), the so-called “law of one wage.” 
Of course, there is not literally a common wage for identical workers in identical jobs.  Even in 
highly competitive markets, idiosyncratic factors (often unmeasuable) among workers, jobs, and locations 
generate equilibrium wage differences.
3  Factors shifting labor demand and supply change continually, so 
wages move toward but do not mechanically achieve levels that equilibrate demand and supply. Yet if 
wages are approximately competitive, we do not expect to see a sustained shortage (unfilled vacancies) or 
sustained surplus of qualified but unemployed applicants.  
Because high vacancy levels in nursing positions are common, a natural explanation for economists 
to consider is monopsonistic power among employers, particularly in hospitals where a (declining) 
majority of RNs are employed.  The canonical competitive model views employers such as hospitals 
being “price (wage) takers” – hospitals face a perfectly elastic firm-level nursing supply curve.  The pure 
monopsony model assumes a labor market with a single employer, for example a hospital that is the sole 
employer of RNs with no mobility across occupations or labor markets.  The graphical monopsony 
model, standard in economics textbooks, is shown in a Figure 1.  The monopsonist maximizes profits by 
equating its marginal revenue product (measured by DL) and marginal labor costs (MLC) at the below-
competitive wage W2 and employment E2.  The hospital prefers to hire E3 nurses at W2, but only E2 are 
 
3 Factors that break down equivalency between wages and spot productivity include training and skills that are firm-
specific (i.e., non-transferable), compensation tied to company seniority (independent of skills), defined benefit 
pension plans that highly penalizes quits among young workers, earnings linked to group rather than individual 
productivity, and pay based on time input rather than hard to measure output.  Moreover, competitive wages differ 
across geographic labor markets due to differences in area amenities and disamenities (weather, water, crime, etc.), 
prices, productivity (e.g., agglomeration economies), and state and local fiscal policies (public goods and taxes).    
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available at that wage.  The hospital could raise wages to attract more employees, but that would lower 
profits.  Hence, pure monopsony is characterized by a systematic labor shortage (E3 – E2).  
Real world nursing markets do not satisfy the assumptions of either pure competition or 
monopsony.  Even in small markets with few nursing employers, RNs have some ability to move between 
employers and across labor markets.  Even in large markets with hundreds of hospital and non-hospital 
nursing employers, employers do not literally face a horizontal labor supply curve.  Were they to lower 
wages they would not lose all their nurses; were they to raise nursing wages they would increases the 
number of qualified job applicants but not infinitely so.  For the real world case where each nursing 
employer faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve but there exist multiple employers, economic 
theory alone (i.e., without empirical evidence) does not point unambiguously to a specific wage-
employment outcome.  Most economists believe that labor markets typically have numerous buyers and 
sellers and sufficient mobility to produce roughly competitive outcomes.  But there is not agreement over 
just how “rough” is roughly competitive. 
“New monopsony” models focus on worker mobility and the information available to workers on 
alternative employment opportunities (Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002; Manning 2003). Rather than 
focusing on the number of employers in a geographic area, this literature argues that imperfect 
information, firm-specific training, worker-specific attachment to firms, and immobility arising from 
various sources, employers face upward sloping labor supply.  Profit maximizing employment and wages 
will vary with the elasticity of labor supply. 
What is the evidence on monopsonistic power in nursing?  There exist two distinct strands of 
literature.  One focuses on obtaining estimates of the labor supply curve elasticity facing employers, with 
monpsonistic power argued to be a function of the inverse elasticity (e.g., see papers summarized in Boal 
and Ransom 1997).  The difficulty here is in obtaining evidence on firm (e.g., hospital) rather than market 
labor supply, since it is the former that is relevant in the monopsony model.  Although there are not a 
large number of studies here, earlier studies suggest non-zero inverse elasticities, implying upward 
sloping labor supply curves (Sullivan 1989; Staiger et al. 1999).  A recent study by Matsudaira (2008), 
which arguably is the best among these studies at identifying RN labor supply to the firm, finds little 
evidence of upward sloping labor supply in California nursing homes.   
The second strand of literature does not estimate labor supply elasticities but instead examines 
whether one sees wage and employment outcomes consistent with monopsony.  For example, Hirsch and 
Schumacher (2005) examine wage differences in RNs across U.S. labor markets.
4  They use as their 
outcome measure the wage of RNs in each market relative to a comparison group of workers outside the 
 
4 Another recent example is Currie, Farsi, and MacLeod (2005), who examine adjustments in nurses’ required effort 
in addition to wages and employment.  
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health sector, conditioning on schooling, experience, and numerous demographic characteristics.  They 
find that RNs earn higher wages overall, but no cross-sectional evidence that relative nursing wages 
increase with city size and the number of hospital employers, or decrease with hospital concentration, as 
predicted by the monopsony model.  Nor do they find employment patterns consistent with monopsony.  
They also include a test of “new monopsony” models that focus on worker mobility rather than market 
structure.  Relative wages are not found to be related to an intercity measure of RN mobility across 
employers.  Indeed, RNs exhibit high rather than low mobility as compared to the average worker.  One 
piece of evidence consistent with the monopsony model is that relative nursing wage growth has been 
slower in markets where hospital concentration increased.  The authors interpret the evidence as 
indicating short-run employer power that fades over time. 
Thus, an apparent puzzle remains.  Monopsony does not provide a convincing explanation for 
observed labor shortages and job vacancies in nursing labor markets.  Not only is there little direct 
evidence, wage studies find that RNs earn not less but considerably more than similar non-RN employees 
(e.g., Hirsch and Schumacher 2005).  If RNs realize sizable wage premiums, shortages are all the more 
puzzling?  The focus of this paper is to reexamine the evidence on relative nursing wages.  Does a nursing 
wage premium (or penalty) exist and, if so, how large is its magnitude?  In short, is there a puzzle in need 
of explanation?  
3.  Data description: The Current Population Survey 
Data on individual workers used in the wage analysis are from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) monthly earnings files for January 2005 through June 2008.  The 
CPS-ORG files include the quarter sample of households for whom the earnings supplement is 
administered.  Our sample includes all employed non-student full-time wage and salary workers who are 
age 20 and over, report their earnings (i.e. imputed earnings are excluded), and have an associate degree 
(academic or vocational), a BA, or an MA.
5 
Our wage is a measure of usual average earnings per hour on one’s primary job.  The straight-time 
wage is reported directly in the CPS for hourly workers, including most RNs.  This is used as our wage 
measure for workers without usual tips, overtime, or commissions.  For salaried workers, plus hourly 
workers receiving supplemental pay, the wage is calculated as usual weekly earnings (inclusive of tips, 
overtime, and commissions) divided by usual hours worked per week.  For the few such workers 
reporting variable usual hours, hours worked the previous week is used to calculate hourly earnings.  For 
workers whose weekly earnings are top-coded (at $2,885), mean earnings above the cap are assigned 
 
5 Part-time workers (defined as less than 35 usual hours worked per week on their principal job) are excluded from 
the comparison group sample, but not the RN sample.  Wage differences between full-time and part-time RNs are 
very small.  Results with part-time RNs excluded produce results nearly identical to those presented.  
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based on gender-specific estimates assuming a Pareto distribution in the upper tail.
6  All earnings figures 
are stated in January 2008 dollars.  To reduce noise due to recording or reporting errors, a small number 
of observations with extreme implicit wage values (less than $3 and $150 or greater) are excluded.  
As seen in table 1, the average hourly wage for RNs during 2005 through June 2008 is $29.45, 
7.4% more than the $27.43 average for the college control group.
7  Focusing instead on the difference in 
the mean log wage, the RN wage advantage is .178 log points (19.5%), more than double the gap based 
on arithmetic means.
8  The difference reflects a compressed RN (occupation-specific) wage distribution 
as compared to the control group’s longer right tail.  The standard deviation associated with RN wages is 
11.6 versus 19.4 for the comparison group wage.  Figure 2a shows the entire RN and control group 
distributions.  As compared to the economy-wide college control group, the RN wage distribution lies to 
the right (ignoring the upper tail) and is substantially more compressed.  Figure 2b shows the right tails of 
the distributions, restricting the sample to those with wages of at least $45 in January 2008 dollars.  
Whereas there are virtually no RNs earning, over, say, $80 an hour, there are nontrivial numbers of non-
RNs realizing such earnings.  These different distributions suggest that a nonparametric estimator may be 
in order (Blackburn 2007), an approach we explore later in the paper. 
Excluded from the analysis are workers who do not report their earnings and thus have their hourly 
wage and/or usual weekly earnings imputed, 28.0% of the RNs and 28.7% of the control group sample.  
Such exclusion is important since nonresponding nurses (and other workers) are generally assigned 
earnings of workers in other occupations (broad occupation category is a donor match criteria).  Inclusion 
of imputed workers causes a substantial attenuation in wage gap estimates (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004; 
Bollinger and Hirsch 2006).  The final sample size, following the above exclusions, is 143,885, which 
includes 8,292 RNs and 135,593 employees in the college comparison group. 
Means for the full sample including imputed earners are shown in the bottom portion of table 1.  
The impact of excluding imputed values is readily evident.  As expected, mean wages for the broad 
control group are similar for the two samples ($27.43 excluding and $27.37 including imputations).  But 
inclusion of imputed earners sharply reduces mean earnings for RNs, from $29.45 absent imputations to 
$28.21 with imputations (mean log wages decline .069 log points), since most nonresponding RNs are 
assigned the earnings of a non-RN donor.  Effectively, the difference between the mean wage (or log 
wage) for responding RNs and the mean of the assigned wage among nonresponding RNs provides a 
 
6 Estimated mean earnings are about 1.6 times the cap for women and 1.8 for men.  These estimates are calculated 
by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson and posted at http://www.unionstats.com. 
7 Because the CPS, absent weighting, is not a representative sample, all means are calculated using CPS sample 
weights. 
8 As is common, percentage approximations are calculated using 100[exp(β)-1], where β is the coefficient on the RN 
dummy.  As noted by Kennedy (1981), a more precise (but still biased) estimate would account for the variance of 
the estimate.  For estimates presented in this paper, the Kennedy adjustment would typically reduce percentage gaps 
by a tenth of one percent.  
6 
 
                                                
“matching” estimate of the RN wage advantage, conditioned on the Census hot deck match attributes 
(Bollinger and Hirsch 2006, table 1).
9  RNs reporting their wage display a 16.4% percentage wage 
advantage (and a .230 log wage advantage) over the $25.30 mean of the imputed wage (or 3.085 mean of 
imputed log wage) for nonrespondent RNs. 
The importance of gender can be seen by breaking out average male and female wages of the 
control group.  The average RN wage of $29.45 is well above the $23.18 mean wage for college women, 
but below the $31.11 average for college men.  Using log points, the RN unadjusted wage advantage is 
.306 relative to women and .060 relative to men.   
4.  Skill and working condition indices constructed from the Occupational Information Network 
The Occupational Information Network (O*NET), produced by the U.S. Department of Labor's 
Employment and Training Administration, is a comprehensive database system for collecting, organizing, 
and describing data on job characteristics and worker attributes within occupations.  The O*NET database 
has been created and updated over the past decade based on input from job analysts and job incumbents.  
The first public release version of O*NET was in late 1998.  We use O*NET 12.0, released in June 2007.   
A data set with 259 O*NET job descriptors from an initial 488 descriptors in the O*NET database 
was created.
10  The job descriptors cover a wide range of attributes, including abilities that influence the 
acquisition and application of knowledge in problem solving to psychomotor, physical and sensory 
abilities to social, technical, and complex problem solving skills.  Most O*NET variables involve types of 
job skills or attributes that are required of workers and are necessary to perform the tasks of an 
occupation.  We construct two sets of indices from the O*NET database, our preferred approach based on 
factor analysis using 206 of the 259 O*NET attributes and a second based on additive indices of a subset 
of the 206 attributes.
11  
To examine how pay varies with job attributes, we merge the O*NET database of job descriptors 
with the CPS database of individuals.  Both O*NET and the CPS identify detailed occupations using 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes.  The CPS identifies workers in 502 SOC civilian 
occupational categories, whereas O*NET provides a more detailed SOC breakdown, with 798 civilian 
 
9 Two caveats attach to this statement.  First, some RNs will be assigned the earnings of an “identical” RN rather 
than non-RN donor, causing attenuation in the estimated gap.  Second, it assumes “conditional missing at random” 
(Bollinger and Hirsch 2006); that is, response bias is ignorable once conditioning on the measured variables.  Note 
that this Census “matching” estimator is conditioned on gender since sex is a Census hot deck match attribute. 
10 The CPS-O*NET database was created jointly by one of the authors and economists at Global Insight.  Most 
O*NET job descriptors are measured using an “importance” and a “level” scale, with these values being very highly 
correlated.  Descriptors measured in level form were retained and the “duplicative” descriptors eliminated, reducing 
the number of O*NET descriptors from an initial total of 488 to 259 with little loss in information. A small number 
of mostly small occupations had not yet released revised ratings since the initial version of O*NET.  
11 The reduction from 259 to 206 attributes is explained in Section 4 below.  
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occupations.  For the most part the crosswalk between O*NET and the CPS occupations is 
straightforward.
12 
The merged CPS-O*NET database allows us to address an important question.  Is a CPS-only 
analysis likely to understate or overstate the nursing/non-nurse wage differential?  CPS variables account 
for individual worker characteristics, but do not fully account for job-specific skills and working 
conditions.  Combining O*NET with the CPS allows us to account more directly for occupational skill 
requirements, working conditions, and other job attributes that influence wages.  Because individual skills 
are measured imperfectly by the schooling and potential experience variables in the CPS, accounting for 
occupational job tasks also helps control for worker-specific skills.
13  
There is no unique method for collapsing the large number of O*NET occupational descriptors into 
a small number of informative variables.  We opt for a relatively simple approach, creating single 
measures of a skill index (SK) and of a working conditions (WC) index.  For the indices constructed using 
factor analysis, 206 of the total 259 O*NET variables in our database are used.  Excluded were 26 
“physical ability” attributes (e.g., finger dexterity, gross body coordination, and near vision) that can be 
considered neither workplace disamenities nor scarce compensable skills; 6 worker “Interest” attributes 
(investigative, social, realistic, etc.); and a set of 21 “Values” attributes (how well does this occupation 
satisfy needs for ability utilization, compensation, helping others, etc.) intended to help guidance 
counselors direct young people into selected fields.  Of the remaining 206 O*NET descriptors, the factor 
skill index, SK1, is constructed from 168 job attributes and the working condition index, WC1, from 38 
attributes.   
Using factor analysis, we construct a first principal factor SK1 that is a linear combination of the 
168 skill attributes and a first principal factor WC1 that is a combination of the 38 working condition 
attributes.  Each of the single first factors loads all attributes in a way that accounts for a maximum 
proportion of the covariance across attributes and occupations.  The factor analysis is weighted by 
 
12 There is a one-to-one match from O*NET to the CPS for 316 occupations.  Most of the remaining involve a 
mapping of two or more O*NET occupations to a CPS category.  In these cases, O*NET descriptor values are 
calculated based on the weighted average across the component O*NET occupations, using May 2005 employment 
reported in the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) as weights.  A small number of CPS occupational 
categories are made up of a combination of O*NET categories defined at such a fine level of detail that OES 
employment figures are not available.  In these cases, component O*NET occupations are assigned equal weights.  
Finally, a small number of CPS occupations are identified as “all other” categories (e.g., “information and records 
clerks, other”) for which there are no O*NET ratings.  These CPS occupation codes were assigned O*NET values 
based on an average ratings (using employment weights) among similar occupations.  
13 Ingram and Neumann (2006) discuss advantages of using job (occupation) attributes in addition to or instead of 
individual attributes in order to measure the returns to skill. Their paper also provides a careful discussion of factor 
analysis, which they use to create skill indices from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).  
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occupational employment, compiled from the CPS for all wage and salary workers.  By construction, the 
factors have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.0.
14  
Note that SK1 and WC1 are constructed independently of the CPS wage data.  In short, the factor 
analysis constructs single index values for each occupation that reflects a “principled” collapsing of all 
O*NET skill-related attributes and all the working condition attributes.
15 
Skill factor SK1 accounts for 41% of the total covariance among the 168 skill attributes across the 
501 Census occupations.  SK1 heavily loads such O*NET measures as critical thinking, judgment and 
decision making, monitoring, written expression, speaking, writing, active listening, written 
comprehension, active learning, negotiation, and persuasion.   
The factor index WC1 accounts for 56% of the total covariance among the 38 working condition 
attributes.  WC1 heavily loads job attributes such as dynamic and static strength, very hot and cold 
temperatures, extremely bright or inadequate lighting, exposed to contaminants, cramped work space or 
awkward position, exposure to burns, cuts, bites, or stings, and exposure to hazardous equipment.   
Our second method for constructing the skill and working condition indices is to take the simple 
arithmetic average of the O*NET attributes.
16  The additive indices SK2 and WC2 use a subset of 154 of 
the 206 O*NET attributes used above, excluding variables for which theory does not a priori predict the 
sign.  Skill index SK2 includes 135 of the 168 attributes used previously, excluding 33 “knowledge 
content” variables covering 33 subject areas (e.g., chemistry, design, fine arts, geography, etc.).   
The working conditions index WC2 includes 19 of the previous 38 variables, excluding 2 “indoors” 
variable largely collinear with three outdoors variables; 9 variables measuring “time spent” in physical 
activities such as sitting, standing, using hands, etc.; 5 strength variables; and 3 work context variables 
measuring the conflict situations and dealing with unpleasant or physically aggressive people.  The 
remaining attributes (seen subsequently in table 4) correspond closely to the types of job attributes 
typically included in studies of compensating differentials.  As widely recognized, it is difficult to identify 
compensable working conditions, in part because heterogeneous worker preferences influence 
occupational choice (worker-job sorting), and because workers with high wages (for reasons that cannot 
be fully controlled) tend to sort into jobs with fewer disamenities (Hwang et al. 1992). 
Using the merged CPS-O*NET database, we provide descriptive evidence comparing skill and 
working condition job attributes for registered nurses and college-educated workers economy-wide.  
                                                 
14 Descriptions of factor analysis are provided in Gorsuch (1983) and Ingram and Neumann (2006). 
15 Although we prefer use of a single skill and single working conditions index, it is possible to include multiple 
indices.  Using multiple-order factors and alternative rotations of factors, we obtain similar qualitative estimates of 
RN wage differentials.  But there is some sensitivity in point estimates.  For example, inclusion of a factor that 
heavily loads occupational attributes measuring caring for others increases estimates of relative RN wages since 
RNs rank high on this factor but such attributes are associated with lower pay, all else the same. 
16 Highly similar results are obtained if the indices are constructed using a weighted rather than simple average, 
using as weights the simple correlation between each job descriptor and occupational wages.  
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Table 2 provides the means of the O*NET indices for the RN and the comparison group, shown jointly 
and separately by gender.  As stated previously, our preferred skill index is SK1, the first principal factor 
constructed from 168 O*NET job descriptors across the employment-weighted CPS/Census occupations.  
The economy-wide college workforce (i.e., those with associate, B.A. and M.A. degrees, excluding RNs) 
has a mean SK1 of .63, with equivalent values for women and men.  The standard deviation is .81, below 
the 1.0 value produced by factor analysis when SK1 was constructed using economy-wide employment 
weights across occupations.  Because the college group exhibits more concentrated employment across 
occupations, dispersion of the index values are lower.  RNs exhibit a substantially higher skill index 
rating in O*NET than does the college control group, a 1.10 value that is more than a half standard 
deviation higher than the control group mean of .63. 
Our preferred working conditions index, WC1, is the first principal factor using 38 working 
condition job descriptors.  The college workforce has a mean WC1 value of -.48, -.65 among women and 
-.27 among men.  The negative means for WC1 (and positive means for SK1) reflect the relatively high 
skills and good working conditions that characterize typical jobs for college-educated workers.  The RN 
occupation receives a WC1 factor score of .29, nearly a full standard deviation above the college 
workforce mean.  In short, O*NET evaluates RN jobs as requiring substantially higher skills and more 
demanding working conditions than does a typical job for college-educated workers.  
An identical pattern is seen based on SK2 and WC2, the employment weighted averages of the 
reduced set of 135 skill and 19 working condition O*NET attributes.  RNs have an SK2 value of 3.59, 
more than a half standard deviation higher than the 3.39 average across all college workers and jobs (3.33 
for women and 3.44 for men).  RNs have a WC2 value of 2.46, more than a standard deviation higher than 
the 1.81 average across all college workers and jobs (1.68 for women and 1.93 for men). 
Space does not permit presenting values for all O*NET job attributes, but examples of skill 
attributes in which RNs are ranked particularly high or low are provided in tables 3a and 3b, along with 
the simple correlation of each attribute with wages.  Ordering workers in the sample based on the values 
on each O*NET attribute, percentile rankings for RNs can be compiled.  RNs rank near the 90
th percentile 
or higher for several skill measures.  RNs rate particularly high on required abilities in problem sensitivity 
and inductive reasoning; on the skills of service orientation and social perspectives, on the work activities 
of identifying objects, actions, and events, and documenting/recording information; and on work context 
attributes measuring the consequence of error, frequency of decision making and importance of being 
exact or accurate.  Many of these job attributes display a high correlation with wages.  RNs also rank high 
in concern for others, assisting and caring for others, working with a work group or team, and 
adaptability/flexibility, although these attributes are weakly or negatively correlated with wages.   
10 
 
RNs rank low in some attributes that are strong positive wage correlates, as seen in table 3b.  These 
attributes include mathematical reasoning, management of financial resources, programming skills, 
scheduling work and activities, communicating with persons outside one’s organization, interacting with 
computers, the level of competition, and use of e-mail. Given the nature of the RN job, these “low” 
ratings are not surprising. 
Table 4 provides a comparison between RNs and the college control group for the 19 O*NET 
physical working conditions in the measure WC2.  RNs rank in the 87
th percentile of the WC2 index.  This 
high percentile ranking reflects not only demanding working conditions in the average RN job, but also 
the relatively low number of physical workplace disamenties in jobs populated by college-educated 
workers.  Among the working conditions in which RNs rank high are exposure to radiation, disease, 
infection, hazardous conditions, and contaminants; physical proximity to others; cramped workspace or 
positions; and the wearing of protective or safety equipment.  RNs rank low in exposure to the elements, 
working in vehicles or equipment, exposure to extreme temperatures; and exposure to high places.  
The descriptive data from O*NET are revealing.  They show that for a large number of workplace 
skills and abilities, nursing jobs are evaluated as requiring high levels.  At the same time, nursing involves 
several demanding working conditions.
17  Thus, some portion of the “high” RN wage is likely to result 
from skills and working conditions not reflected in typical wage analyses.  We now turn to wages, first 
using standard analysis and then introducing the O*NET job attributes. 
6.  Wage analysis using worker and location attributes  
In this section, we provide “CPS-only” regression analysis comparing hourly earnings among 
registered nurses and our control group of college-trained workers, with controls for standard individual 
and location characteristics.  By these measures, RNs are paid well. 
Lines 1 and 2 of table 5 provide the percentage difference in unadjusted mean wages and the 
difference in mean log wages, based on the values seen previously in table 1.  Standard wage regression 
results are presented in line 3.
18  The CPS-only log wage equations include potential experience (i.e., 
years since schooling completed) in quartic form, plus dummy variables for BA and MA degrees (versus 
associate degree), race/ethnicity (3 dummies for four groups), marital status (2), foreign-born (citizen and 
non-citizen), year (3) city size (6), and region (8).  Inclusion of the regressors has little effect on the RN 
wage gap, the CPS-only gap being .220 log points, just .04 points higher than the .178 raw gap.  Such 
                                                 
17 In work not show, we compile descriptive evidence on O*NET “work value” descriptors not included in the wage 
analysis.  The nursing occupation tends to satisfy the specific needs associated with workers who value social 
service, activity, co-workers, achievement, ability utilization, social status, and security.  It is ranked low with 
respect to satisfying needs for recognition, independence, working conditions, and company policies and practices. 
18 Regression estimates are based on weighted least squares using CPS sample weights.  Results are not sensitive to 
the use of weights.   
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results suggest that the comparison group choice based on education is a reasonable one.  Based on the 
standard log wage regression analysis shown in line 3, RNs are paid extremely well; even compared to a 
mix of college educated women and men.  A “CPS-only” estimate of the RN wage advantage is much 
higher if an all-female comparison group is used, however, producing a gap of .348 as opposed to .220.
19   
The question of how to treat gender is a difficult one.  We want to compare RNs’ actual wages to 
their long-run opportunity cost wages – what these individuals would have been earning in an alternative 
career path with similar costs of training and equally attractive working conditions.  In some respects the 
average RN worker and job are most similar to male workers and jobs and in other respect to female 
workers and jobs.  If the rationale for a gender-specific comparison is that women and men differ 
systematically in terms of preferences, job attributes, and accumulated work experience, then our 
inclusion of detailed occupational job attributes (seen in the next section) weakens the strength of such an 
argument, at least to the extent that O*NET measures capture such differences.  We believe comparing 
RNs to a mix of male and female wages/jobs (48% women and 52% men) is reasonable.  We continue to 
include results using the male- and female-only control groups, however, since not all readers need agree 
and such comparisons are informative in their own right. 
7.  Relative nursing wages accounting for worker and job attributes  
Standard wage analyses using the CPS and other data sets are limited by the imperfect 
measurement of individual worker skills and the absence of direct information required job skills and 
working conditions.  If compensable skills and working conditions required of RNs are substantially 
greater (less) for RNs than among measurably similar workers economy-wide, estimates of the RN wage 
gap are likely to be overstated (understated).  In this section, we use the merged CPS/O*NET database to 
incorporate job attributes and worker characteristics into the wage analysis.
20  Our approach is 
straightforward.  We compare RN wage gaps from standard log wage regressions with and without 
control for the O*NET skill and working condition indices.  In the next section, we provide matching 
estimates of percentage wage gaps that do not rely on the functional form of the wage equation.  
Our preferred measures of workplace skills and working conditions are the principal factors SK1 
and WC1 described previously.  As seen in line 4 of table 5, addition of SK1 and WC1 to the CPS wage 
equation reduces the estimated RN wage gap by .14 log points, from .220 to .083.  This large reduction in 
the estimated wage gap primarily reflects the effect of the skill index.  SK1 has a substantial effect on 
wages and the RN occupation has a high value of the skill index.  The coefficient of .212 on SK1 implies 
                                                 
19 Estimating a pooled equation with inclusion of a gender dummy produces a wage gap similar to that shown for 
women, since such an approach effectively compares 93% of the RN sample to women and only 7% to men.   
20 Because multiple workers are assigned common O*NET values for each detailed occupation, we estimate and 
present standard errors “clustered” on occupation.  Absent clustering, standard errors are roughly a tenth as large as 
those shown.  Clustering does not change the coefficients.  
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that a .47 difference in SK1 (the difference between the mean index value and value for RNs) is 
associated with wages of about .10 log points higher (inclusion of SK1 and WC1 change all the model’s 
coefficients, making such calculations approximate). 
Controlling for job working conditions and accurately estimating compensating differentials for 
disamenities is notoriously difficult (Hwang et al. 1992), estimates typically being biased downward.  
When we include the log of our index measure, WC1, of occupation-specific physical working conditions, 
we obtain a positive coefficient (but not significant) using the combined male-female sample, consistent 
with theory (the coefficients are negative and close to zero using the gender-specific control groups).  The 
impact of working conditions based on the WC1 coefficient estimate of .024 and a RN-control group 
difference in mean WC1 of .77 is to lower the RN wage advantage by about .02 log points. 
We also present results using the simple alternative indices of skills and working conditions.  SK2 
and WC2 include 135 and 19 O*NET job descriptors, respectively, a subset of the descriptors included in 
factor indices SK1 and WC1. Each of these indices represents the unweighted average value across the 
included variables and enters the wage regression in log form.  Although these are crude indices as 
compared to those obtained through factor analysis, qualitative results are similar to those shown 
previously.  Inclusion of lnSK2 and lnWC2 causes the RN wage differential to decline from .220 absent 
the job controls to .126, roughly half the CPS-only estimate.
21  The difference between this estimate and 
the .083 estimate using the principal factor indices is largely driven by the (‘wrong’) negative but 
insignificant sign on the working conditions index, increasing the RN gap estimate despite more difficult 
working conditions for RNs than for the comparison group. 
Table 5 also shows results using gender-specific comparison groups.  With an all-male control 
group, the RN wage gap using indices SK1 and WC1 is effectively zero (.008).  Compared to women, 
however, the RN gap is substantial (.257).  Although such estimates are informative, we focus on the 
“gender-blind” wage gap estimate (i.e., .083) given the presence of detailed job attribute controls.  What 
is clear from our analysis to this point is that skill attributes are strongly related to wages across the labor 
market, the RN job is evaluated as possessing a high level of skills, and estimated RN wage gaps are 
sharply reduced following control for job skills. 
8.  Do logarithmic wage gaps overstate relative nursing wages?  
A final consideration, and an important one, is whether the log wage gap measure from the 
Mincerian wage equation is appropriate in this particular application.  Evident from the descriptive 
statistics is a large difference in wage gaps between RNs and the comparison group based on then 
percentage differences in mean dollars versus the differences in mean logs converted to a percentage.  
                                                 
21 The coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities measuring the percentage effect on wages from a percentage 
change in the skill or working conditions index. The raw log wage difference between RNs and the comparison group is .178 log points, which translates 
into an approximate percentage differential of 19.5%.  In sharp contrast, the percentage difference in 
mean dollar wages, ( C RN W W − ) /  C W , is only 7.4%.  A compressed right tail of the RN wage 
distribution as compared to the comparison group (as seen in Figures 2a and 2b) causes the log wage gap 
to provide a poor approximation of the RN percentage wage gap.  
Although the Mincerian semilog wage equation remains the standard approach for estimating 
percentage wage gaps in labor economics, Blackburn (2007) has shown that it is not appropriate in all 
applications (see related work by Manning 1998; Manning and Mullahy 2001).  The Mincerian wage 
equation model is: 
u e W
xβ =  
If u is homoskedastic then the model can be written and estimated in its standard semilog form: 
u x W + = β ln  
The semilog model provides consistent estimates of β only under the assumption that the distribution of 
the error term is independent of the regressors.  However, the assumption of homoskedasticity is violated 
in our case since the error distribution is correlated with the RN indicator variable.   
Our approach to the log gap issue is to examine RN wage gaps obtained from a propensity score 
matching model that does not rely on the functional form of the wage equation.  The matching approach 
addresses two concerns.  First, for each RN it provides a matched non-RN with similar attributes (i.e., a 
similar conditional propensity to be a nurse).  This allows us to check if RN regression gap estimates are 
sensitive to the data support and implicit weighting of the control group.  Second, the matching RN wage 
gaps estimate are nonparametric, constructed from straightforward mean wage differences in dollars or 
logs between RNs and the matched comparison group.  Thus, we need not rely on the log transformation 
to estimate the percentage gap.  A comparison of the Mincerian log gap with the matching estimate of the 
percentage gap shows whether or not the semilog specification provides a reliable estimate of the 
percentage gap.  
The propensity score matching differentials are estimated as follows.  First a logit model is 
estimated for the full sample (both RNs and non-RNs) on the likelihood of being an RN, conditional on 
the explanatory variables previously included in the wage equation.  First-step models are estimated with 
and without inclusion of the O*NET variables.  All workers are then ordered from low to high based on 
their likelihood of being an RN (the propensity score) and divided into deciles (10 groups).
22  Each RN is 
then matched randomly (with replacement) to a non-RN within the same decile.  The “log percentage” 




22 Quintiles are typically used for matching estimators.  Because our control group is extremely large and has a 
strong overlap with the RN distribution over the data support, we are able to use a finer breakdown to improve the 
“quality” of the matches (i.e., closer propensity scores). and “dollar percentage” RN wage gaps for this same set of matches are then calculated in straightforward 
fashion.  We conduct and compile 100 sets of these matches.  We report the means and standard 
deviations of both the percentage and the mean log RN wage gaps across these 100 rounds.  
Line 1 of table 6 repeats the previously reported log wage gaps from our regression analysis, 
coupled with the percentage differentials implied by these gaps.  Line 2 reports the corresponding RN log 
wage gaps compiled from the matching estimator.  Differences between lines 1 and 2 stem largely from 
moving from a regression weighted data support to a nonparametric matching estimator in which the 
control group support “mimics” the attributes of the “treatment” nurse sample.  The estimated log gaps 
from matching (line 2) are highly similar to the regression estimates (line 1).  As shown previously, the 
standard wage regression estimate of the RN log gap is .220 and that with the O*NET skill and working 
condition indices is .083.  The corresponding matching estimators are .234 and .066, within .02 log points 
of the regression estimates.  The similarity in estimates indicates that the regressions provide a weighted 
control group support similar to the support from explicit matching.  The use of an OLS regression versus 
matching does not by itself produce meaningful differences in RN log gap estimates.   
Line 3 provides the percentage differential estimate from the matching model, calculated directly 
by ( C RN W − W ) /  C W  rather than approximated by conversion from the log gap.  The differences are 
substantial.  In contrast to the 26.5% log wage gap matching estimate (without O*NET), the 
corresponding arithmetic percentage calculated from the same matched individuals is 15.0%.  With 
inclusion of O*NET, the RN log wage gap from the matching estimator is 6.9%, but the arithmetic 
percentage calculated directly from the same matched sample is -4.0%.
23  In short, use of the standard log 
wage gap estimator for RNs causes wage gaps to be overstated by about 11 percentage points.  Nursing 
wages appear roughly equivalent to long-run opportunity costs. 
Although the gender-blind results are our preferred estimates, table 6 also shows matching 
estimates using female- and male-only control groups.  Using the female control group (line 4), the match 
estimates are considerably higher than the gender-blind approach, 35.4% and 18.1% based on propensity 
score models excluding and including the O*NET skill and working condition indices.  As expected, 
estimates are substantially lower using an all-male comparison group (line 5).  
9.  Other issues: Benefits and shift work 
This study focuses on earnings differences between RNs and similar workers and jobs.  A more 
complete analysis would account for nonwage benefits and focus on total compensation.  Unfortunately, 
household data providing information on worker attributes do not generally report the dollar costs of 




23 The decline in the percentage gap from 15.0% to -4.0% is due to a $5.04 increase in the matched control group 
wage across the 100 rounds (the RN mean wage remains the same) resulting from adding the O*NET skill and 
working condition indices to the logit models that generate the propensity scores and thus affect resulting matches.   
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benefits, while surveys providing information on benefit costs do not report worker and location 
characteristics.  Hence, multivariate analysis of RN benefits relative to a control group is not possible.  
Published data on employer benefit costs for RNs, however, suggest that benefits for RNs are no 
larger than for workers economy-wide.  The Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (U.S. BLS 
2008a) provides data on total compensation, dividing it between wages and salaries versus benefits, the 
latter including a comprehensive set of voluntary and mandated benefits (mandatory being Social 
Security, Medicare, UI, etc.).  In June 2008, benefits as a percent of total hourly compensation among 
private sector RNs (table 27, p. 285) measure 25.9% – $11.50 in benefits, $32.90 in wages and salaries, 
and $44.40 in compensation.  For all full-time private sector workers the corresponding figure is 27.2% of 
compensation – $8.26 in benefits, $22.16 in wages and salaries, and $30.42 in compensation (table 19, p. 
224 – a full-time/part-time breakdown is not provided for private and public workers combined).
24  Based 
on these figures, it is fair to conclude that benefits as a percent of total compensation is no greater, and 
probably somewhat lower, for RNs than for comparable workers and jobs economy-wide.  Hence, 
estimates of the RN wage gap do not understate the differential in compensation. 
An issue not formally addressed in this paper is the difference in timing of work.  Healthcare 
workers are more likely to work weekends and non-standard shifts.  A recent BLS newsletter (U.S. BLS 
2008b) reports that healthcare workers are more likely to work on weekends and holidays than are 
workers economy-wide.  Using information from the 2003-2007 American Time Use Surveys they report 
that on a given weekday, 80% of full-time healthcare practitioner and technical workers (a category that 
includes RNs) are working, compared to 88.1% of workers in non-health occupations.  On holidays and 
weekends, 35.1% of the health employees as compared to 31.2% of non-health employees are working. 
Failure to account for timing of work will cause the RN wage differential to be overstated.  Of 
course, it is difficult “price” differentials associated with time of work since the choice to work particular 
days or shifts is affected by selection (e.g., Kostiuk 1990).  We can construct a rough back-of-the-
envelope estimate.  Schumacher and Hirsch (1997) examine differences in earnings for RNs associated 
with shift work.  Based on the May 1985 and 1991 CPS Dual Job Supplements, they find that 57% of 
RNs work day shifts, with the others split between night, evening, rotating or split shift, and other shifts.  
Relative to a day shift, they estimate compensating differentials for night work of 11 percent and for the 
other shifts about 4 percent.  Assume that such scheduling and shift differentials for RNs hold today.  
Published information from the May 2004 CPS supplement on flexible and shift schedules provides 
recent data for full-time workers economy-wide.  As compared to the 57% of RNs who have day 
schedules, the economy-wide the figure is 85%.  Based on the differences between RNs and workers 
 
24 The ECEC includes supplemental pay (e.g., overtime and shift pay) as benefits.  The figures shown in the text 
subtract supplemental pay from benefits and add them to wages and salary.  Absent the shift of supplemental pay, 
benefits as a percentage of total compensation are 29.5% for RNs and 30.5% for full-time private sector workers.  
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economy-wide for each shift category, coupled with the wage differentials estimates by Hirsch and 
Schumacher, we calculate that the RN wage differential would be .018 log points lower if adjusted for 
shift work.
25  Although this is a rough estimate, it reinforces our conclusion that relative pay among 
nurses is overstated by standard wage regression analysis and is likely to be close to opportunity costs.   
10.  Interpretation and conclusions: Is the shortage puzzle resolved? 
Our analysis has at least three important implications.  Most important, the results imply that wage 
differences between RNs and similar workers economy-wide are substantially smaller than implied by 
standard log wage estimates.  Three principal reasons lead to this conclusion.  First, the RN job requires 
unusually high skills as compared to typical jobs populated by workers with similar levels of schooling, 
skills not fully reflected in standard CPS variables.  Likewise, the RN job involves more difficult working 
conditions than do most jobs filled by college-educated workers.  Controlling for occupation skills and 
working conditions sharply reduces estimates of an RN wage advantage.  Second, comparing nursing 
wages to a combined male and female control group lowers estimates of the RN wage gap compared to 
estimates conditioning on gender or using female-only control groups.  And third, Mincerian log wage 
gaps substantially overstate percentage wage gaps among nurses.  Using an arguably more appropriate 
nonparametric matching estimator, the RN percentage differential is close to zero.   
A second and more general implication is that wage analyses can be enriched by supplementing 
standard worker characteristics and location measures with job-based measures of compensable skills and 
working conditions.  The O*NET database provides an unusually rich set of occupation-based measures.   
A third implication is that Mincerian log wage gap estimates should be questioned not just in the 
case of nurses, but whenever one compares a single occupation or “narrow” treatment group to a 
(generally appropriate) broad comparison group.  There is no shortage of such examples in the labor 
economics literature. 
Prior studies have found that registered nurses receive substantially higher pay than other college-
educated women.  We obtain similar results using the standard approach.  A large RN wage premium 
would be puzzling and difficult to explain if nursing markets are close to competitive.  Large premiums 
are even more difficult to explain with a monopsony model, which predicts that profit maximizing 
employers pay wages below opportunity costs, even those such wages result in shortages (profits would 
fall were wages to increase).  Our analysis goes a long way toward resolving this apparent puzzle.  We 
conclude that RNs are paid wages relatively close to rather than well above long-run opportunity costs – 
that is, wages close to what would have been received in an alternative career in jobs with similar skills 
and working conditions. 
                                                 
25 The details of this calculation are available on request.  
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The conclusion that RNs are paid close to opportunity costs reduces but does not eliminate the 
puzzle of shortages.  How does one explain high vacancy rates and shortages if RN wage rates are paid, 
on average, at (or above) opportunity costs?  We rule out monopsony as the principal explanation, given 
that long-run wages are close to opportunity costs, RNs demonstrate high mobility across multiple 
employers, and because there is little direct evidence supporting the monopsony explanation (e.g., Hirsch 
and Schumacher 2005; Matsudaira 2008).  
A more convincing explanation for shortages, although not one we analyze formally, involves two 
factors, one on the demand side and the other the supply side.  First, over time there has been rising 
demand for nurses combined with hospital budgets that adjust with a lag.  Second, entry into the nursing 
profession is constrained, with available training slots below the number of qualified applicants.  
Constraints on nursing program enrollments stem from several sources, but key factors are the limited 
growth in nursing education opportunities (relative to demand) and the difficulty in hiring qualified 
nursing faculty at salary levels funded by educational institutions (e.g., Aiken 2008; Rahn and Wartman 
2007, Spetz and Given 2003).  The American Association of Colleges of Nursing (2007) reports 
increasing enrollments in recent years (at a declining rate), but record numbers of qualified applicants 
turned away, 29.4, 37.5, and 38.4 thousand in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  This compares to 51.2 thousand 
B.A. nursing degrees conferred in the 2005-06 academic year, the most recent year available (Snyder, 
Dillow, and Hoffman, 2008, table 265).  A shortage of nursing faculty is the primary reason cited for 
rejecting applicants.
26 
A final point is that modest deviations of nursing wages from long-run opportunity costs cannot be 
ruled out a priori.  On the one hand, funding constraints among employers combined with imperfect 
mobility can lead to “underpaid” nurses, although there is little evidence suggesting systematic 
underpayment.  On the other hand, institutional constraints on nurse training can lead to shortages 
coexisting with wages above long run opportunity costs, with “short-run” RN wages exceeding pay 
among similar non-nursing workers and jobs.  The supply constraint in training might best explain wage 
advantages seen for RNs compared to other college-educated workers.  The size of any wage advantage, 
however, is not nearly as large as standard analysis suggests.  Our evidence shows that RNs are neither 
substantially “underpaid’ nor “overpaid.”  We cannot rule out that RNs, on average, are paid about “right” 
– close to long-run opportunity costs.  
 
26 An additional supply explanation for which there is some evidence is that labor supply among nurses (particularly 
married women) is countercyclical, accentuating shortage problems during high demand periods (Buerhaus 1993; 
Buerhaus, Staiger, and Auerbach 2003). References  
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Monopsony in the Labor Market 
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Wages among RNs and the Comparison Group,  













    
 



































    
 
















































Shown are weighted means (using CPS sample weights), with standard deviations in 
parentheses.  RN includes only those with at least an associate degree and no greater 
than a master’s degree.  The sample excluding imputed earners is used in all 
subsequent empirical work.  Not shown in the table are means for the imputed sample.  
The mean imputed dollar wage for nonrespondent RNs is $25.30 and mean imputed 




















































Shown are weighted means (using CPS sample weights), with standard deviations  
in parentheses.  All RNs are assigned uniform O*NET attribute values. 
 Table 3a 







Abilities --  Enduring attributes of the individual that influence performance 
Problem Sensitivity  96  0.32 
Inductive Reasoning  93  0.37 
Oral Comprehension  85  0.38 
Deductive Reasoning  78  0.42 
 
Skills -- Developed capacities that facilitate learning, the more rapid acquisition of knowledge, or performance of 
activities that occur across jobs 
Service Orientation  92  0.21 
Social Perceptiveness  90  0.17 
Science 88  0.27 
Critical Thinking  87  0.37 
 
Work Activities – Types of job behaviors occurring on multiple jobs 
Assisting and Caring for Others  96  -0.01 
Identifying Objects, Actions, and Events  95  0.26 
Documenting/Recording Information  95  0.23 
Monitor Processes, Materials, or Surroundings  91  0.20 
Updating and Using Relevant Knowledge  89  0.34 
Performing for or Working Directly with the Public  87  -0.07 
 
Work Context - Physical and social factors that influence the nature of work 
Consequence of Error  96  0.27 
Work With Work Group or Team  91  0.17 
Responsible for Others' Health and Safety  89  0.03 
Frequency of Decision Making  89  0.18 
Importance of Being Exact or Accurate  88  0.25 
 
Work Style -- Personal characteristics that can affect how well someone performs a job 
Concern for Others  95  -0.08 
Self Control  95  -0.06 
Adaptability/Flexibility 95  0.12 
Cooperation 94  -0.03 
Dependability 92  0.01 
Integrity 89  0.12 
Independence 89  0.16 
Attention to Detail  87  0.15 
Stress Tolerance  86  0.06 
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 Table 3b 








Abilities --  Enduring attributes of the individual that influence performance 
Mathematical Reasoning  6  0.27 
Visualization 7  0.12 
Number Facility  8  0.19 
Fluency of Ideas  30  0.33 
Originality 30  0.33 
    
Skills -- Developed capacities that facilitate learning, the more rapid acquisition of knowledge, or performance 
of activities that occur across jobs 
Management of Financial Resources  10  0.25 
Installation 16  0.19 
Programming 17  0.25 
Management of Material Resources  21  0.26 
    
Work Activities – Types of job behaviors occurring on multiple jobs 
Scheduling Work and Activities  19  0.23 
Communicating with Persons Outside Organization  21  0.26 
Interacting With Computers  23  0.27 
Thinking Creatively  26  0.26 
Performing Administrative Activities  26  0.15 
    
Work Context - Physical and social factors that influence the nature of work 
Degree of Automation  18  0.07 
Electronic Mail  26  0.31 
Level of Competition  29  0.24 
Public Speaking  31  0.08 
    
Work Style -- Personal characteristics that can affect how well someone performs a job
* 
Persistence 61  0.22 
Leadership 62  0.17 
Innovation 68  0.20 
    
* RNs were in the 61





RN Percentile Rankings of Working Condition Index  





Working Condition Index (WC2) 87
  Physical Proximity to Others 95
  Exposed to Radiation 95
  Exposed to Disease or Infections 95
  Wear Specialized Protective or Safety Equipment 93
  Cramped Work Space, Awkward Positions 93
  Wear Common Protective or Safety Equipment  91
  Exposed to Hazardous Conditions 88
  Exposed to Contaminants 88
  Sounds, Noise Distracting or Uncomfortable 83
  Exposed to Minor Burns, Cuts, Bites, or Stings 83
  Extremely Bright or Inadequate Lighting 81
  Exposed to Whole Body Vibration 70
  Exposed to Hazardous Equipment 60
  Outdoors, Under Cover 47
  In an Enclosed Vehicle or Equipment 37
  Very Hot or Cold Temperatures 32
  Exposed to High Places 32
  Outdoors, Exposed to Weather 23






RN Wage Differentials with the College Comparison Group, Jointly and by Gender 
 




















1. Percent wage 
difference 
0.074  -- --  0.271  -- --  -0.053  --  -- 
2. Unadjusted log 
wage differential 
0.178  -- --  0.306  -- --  0.060  --  -- 




-- --  .348 
(.022) 
-- --  .115 
(.025) 
-- -- 









































Shown are wage differences comparing RNs to pooled, female, and male college-educated comparison groups.  Row 1 shows the percent difference in the average 
real wage using the comparison group as the base.  Row 2 shows the unadjusted log wage differential.  Row 3 shows the coefficient on a dummy variable from a log 
wage regression that includes controls for potential experience (i.e., years since schooling completed) in quartic form, plus dummy variables for BA and MA degrees 
(versus associate degree), race/ethnicity (3 dummies for four groups), marital status (2), foreign-born (citizen and non-citizen), year (3) city size (6), and region (8).  
Row 4 adds SK1 and WC1 to the regression and row 5 the log of SK2 and WC2.  Rows 4 and 5 display coefficients on the skill and working condition indices 




 Table 6 
Propensity Score Matching Results 
 
   
CPS Only 
CPS Plus O*NET 
SK1 and WC1 
1.  Regression log gaps and implied percentage .220 / 24.6% 
    (.025) 
.083 / 8.7% 
      (.034) 
2.  Matching log gaps and implied percentage .234 / 26.4% 
    [.007] 
.066 / 6.8% 
      [.008] 













Line 1 regression estimates and clustered standard errors shown previously in table 5.  In lines 1 and 2, 
estimated log gaps and implied percentage gaps are shown.  Matching estimates in lines 2-5 are based 
on 100 imputation rounds and random matching within deciles.  Standard deviations across the 100 
rounds are shown in brackets.  
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